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Abstract This paper explores the relationship between trust
and household adaptation strategies for a sample of respon-
dents in a Mexican agrarian community. In particular, we
analyze how levels of personalized, generalized, and institu-
tionalized trust shape the adaptation strategies of smallholders,
and find that households characterized by low levels of gen-
eralized and institutionalized trust are less likely to be involved
in a diversified livelihood strategy. Instead, they tend to con-
tinue with the traditional activity of maize production. In
contrast, high levels of personalized trust are associated with a
livelihood strategy that focuses on cattle breeding and pasture
growing. We argue that trust explains why some people more
readily ‘catch up’ with opportunities created by an expanding
market, while others lag behind in poverty. This paper thus
seeks to contribute to the debate on the role of trust in economic
actions and decision-making processes of smallholders.
Keywords Rural livelihoods  Adaptation 
Smallholders  Market liberalization  Trust 
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Introduction
Since the 1980s, the Mexican government has embraced
market liberalization and implemented neoliberal policy
reforms to stabilize the economy, stimulate efficiency gains
and sustainable economic growth, and alleviate rural pov-
erty. Subsequently, the Mexican agricultural sector has
undergone substantial reforms with far-going consequences
for the livelihoods of smallholders. Local smallholders are
forced to adapt to economic pressures caused by lower
prices for maize and other traditional crops, weak local and
regional demands, and large reductions in public sector
support for agriculture (Wise 2007). While there is a
growing interest in identifying smallholders’ individual
adaptation strategies and measuring their impact on pov-
erty, little attention is directed at explaining the factors that
shape their choices for a certain adaptation strategy (Pel-
ling and High 2005).
Smallholders’ adaptation to global change is a dynamic
process of long-term shifts in household strategies in
response to actual or expected effects of contextual change
(Smit and Wandel 2006). These strategies can enhance
existing security and wealth, or reduce vulnerability
(Davies and Hossain 2007). Adaptation can be reactive,
concurrent, or anticipatory, spontaneous, or planned (Pel-
ling and High 2005) in response to changing conditions,
stress, hazard, risk, or opportunities in the environment
(Smit and Wandel 2006). The social-economic environment
is important because it determines people’s access to
resources, and therefore options and capacity to adapt.
However, most adaptation studies have a narrow focus on
individual rational choice, and ignore the wider structural
context in which decision-making takes place (Pennartz and
Niehof 1999; Murray 2001). Consequently, little is known
about the significance of macro-economic changes for rural
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livelihoods, and why some groups of actors are able to take
up opportunities generated by an expanding economy,
while others are not (Bussolo and Lecomte 1999).
This paper examines how trust influences adaptive
behavior of smallholders and affects economic outcomes.
We use surveys to obtain various measures of trust, and use
factor analysis to identify underlying factors (allowing us
to distinguish between institutionalized, personalized, and
generalized trust). We then relate our trust proxies to
adaptation strategies and wealth levels. We thus connect
the notions of adaptation and trust (related to social capital)
to obtain a better understanding of the social factors that
influence households’ adaptation choices. Specifically, we
ask which trust dimensions matter for adaptation behavior
and livelihood choices, and ask how trust variables (via
livelihood choices) matter for the accumulation of assets.
Since mid-1980, an increasing number of studies attri-
bute economic differences between groups of actors to
differential levels of social capital in addition to standard
economic variables. While social capital is an elusive
concept in social sciences, most studies agree it consists of
three important dimensions: trust, social norms, and mem-
bership of social networks (see, e.g.,Putnam 1995; Durlauf
and Fafchamps 2004; Portes 1998). We focus on the role of
trust in adaptation strategies. Trust may be considered an
asset for economic activities, as it promotes cooperation and
stimulates more efficient social and economic exchange
(Dasgupta 1998). As stated by Arrow (1972, p. 357),
‘‘virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an
element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a
period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by
the lack of mutual confidence.’’ Economists have used
cross-country studies to demonstrate a positive correlation
between trust indicators and macro-level economic perfor-
mance (Fukuyama 1995; Knack 2000; Zak and Knack
2001; Tabillini 2007; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta
et al. 1997). Similarly, Easterly (2005) argues that top-down
market reform and liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s in
many developing countries failed to yield the desired results
due to the absence of sufficient ‘trust’. In addition, Uslaner
(2002) argued social trust causes positive economic out-
comes such as volunteering, charity, and advocacy for
policies promoting growth.
Few studies pay attention to the factors that determine the
relationship between trust and economic outcomes. We use
the livelihood framework to unravel this relationship at the
household level. We seek to ‘unpack’ total household
income and analyze the role of trust in adaptation strategy
choice. Based on earlier studies we assume that current levels
of trust are shaped by experiences. Consequently, we use
qualitative data on recent historical events in the social and
institutional context to explain contemporary characteristics
of trust. This case study is contextualized by the specificity of
Mexico’s transition from state-directed rural development to
neoliberal-guided rural development in the 1990s.
This paper aims to contribute to a more comprehensive
understanding of the historical ‘embeddedness’ of trust
building that ultimately shapes adaptive choices and
actions. We provide evidence that households’ capacity to
adapt to market opportunities is shaped by local trust
indicators, and argue that livelihood adaptation should be
understood within larger and encompassing processes
going on within the society at large.
Livelihoods and social capital
We use the livelihoods framework to analyze how neo-
liberal reforms alter the opportunities and constraints of
smallholder livelihoods and shape household adaptation
capacity. A commonly used definition of ‘livelihood’ is
provided by Ellis (2000, p. 10): ‘‘the assets (natural,
physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities,
and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social
relations) that together determine the living gained by an
individual or household.’’
People use assets to respond to risks, uncertainties, and
opportunities, balancing security and income objectives.
Adaptation strategies are ex ante household strategic deci-
sions anticipating failures in income streams due to changing
circumstances within a relatively long-term perspective
(Davies 1993). Coping strategies are medium-term ex post
strategies in response to unanticipated failure in major
resources necessary to make ends meet (Zoomers 1999). The
adaptation capacity of small-holders is defined as the extent
to which they can benefit from newly created opportunities,
and are able to use these to reduce risk and vulnerability. We
use the concept of social capital to analyze the intersection
between social relations and purposive actions. Following
Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2002), we distinguish between
two components of social capital: structural and cognitive
social capital. Structure is derived from the various forms of
organization that people are part of, particularly roles, rules,
precedents, procedures, as well as a wide variety of networks
that contribute to cooperation and collective action. The
content of social capital consists of cognitive features,
embedded in people and resulting from mental processes. It
is manifested in trust, local ethics, traditions, morals, shared
norms, attitudes, and beliefs (Uphoff 2000).
Trust and economic activity
The term trust is used in a variety of distinct, and some-
times incompatible ways (Kramer 1999). Trust may be
seen as an optimistic expectation or belief regarding other
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agents’ behavior and the social system in which they are
embedded (Garfinkel 1963). It involves people’s belief in
others’ intentions not to harm them, to respect their rights,
and to carry out obligations (Sabatini 2009). In other
words, trust refers to the confidence that a partner will not
exploit the vulnerabilities of the other (Gambetta 1998).
We follow Fukuyama (1995, p. 26) and consider trust ‘‘the
expectation that arises within a community of regular,
honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly
shared norms on the part of other members of that com-
munity.’’ Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that trust and
norms of civic cooperation are stronger in countries with
formal institutions that protect property and contract rights,
and in countries that are less polarized along lines of class
or ethnicity. Similarly, Whiteley (2000) finds that social
capital has a positive influence on growth that matches the
influence of human capital (see also Zak and Knack 2001).
Using cross-section data from 48 countries, Caldero´n et al.
(2002) show that trust is correlated with financial depth and
efficiency and with stock market development. Beugelsdijk
et al. (2004) find that the marginal impact of trust on
growth is greater in low-trust countries, and Ahlerup et al.
(2009) show that the marginal effect of trust decreases with
institutional strength. Social capital and formal institutions
may be substitutes in development, so that social capital is
especially important for the poorest countries where formal
institutions are weak. However, Tu and Bulte (2010) find
that trust and formal institutions may feed off each other as
well. Greater trust results in greater market participation.
Broadly speaking, the literature defines three types of
trust. The first is ‘personalized trust’, existing within
established relationships and social networks (Hughes et al.
2000). The second is ‘generalized trust’ and comprises trust
extended to strangers (Putnam 1998; Dasgupta 1998;
Uslaner 1999). The third type of trust is ‘institutionalized
trust’, which refers to basic confidence in the formal
institutions of governance, including fairness of rules,
official procedures, dispute resolution, markets and
resource allocation, or the political, tax or juridical system
(Stone 2001). The origin of these types of trust seems to
vary. Personalized trust arises from repeated interactions
(Fafchamps 2002), while generalized and institutionalized
trust are not based on experience but arise respectively
from actors’ general knowledge about the population and
the support they have received from the government and
formal institutions (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997; Platteau
1994). Moreover, generalized and institutionalized trust are
transmitted within the family, from parents to children (cf.
Algan and Cahuc 2006, 2007; Guiso et al. 2006; Dohmen
et al. 2006). Tabillini (2007) argues that distant political
institutions affect current trust attitudes and values with
possible economic effects. Trust moves slowly and is
influenced by political and economic outcomes in the past.
This links up with the notion of agency and the idea that
actors’ contemporary choices oriented to future trajectories
are informed by past experience (in its ‘iterational’ or
habitual aspect) (Emirbayer and Mische 1994).
Based on this review, we expect that the local history
influences contemporary trust levels, and accordingly
shapes present adaptation choices and economic outcomes.
Data and empirical strategy
We used a combination of qualitative and quantitative
approaches to analyze the multidimensional nature of
household adaptation to market changes. The quantitative
measurements of livelihood strategies are placed against a
local social–historical and cultural background. To collect
data, the first author conducted a field study of 12 months
between March 2007 and May 2010. The qualitative research
on smallholder livelihoods included participant observation,
semi-structured interviews, case studies, and life histories
with representatives of various groups of members of the
local community. The qualitative data are primarily used to
get insight into the socio-historical context. Valuable infor-
mation was gathered through 30 in-depth interviews. Key
informants were interviewed for their knowledge on specific
issues. These interviews were used to get a better under-
standing of the social, cultural, economic, and historical
context at the community level. Quantitative data on liveli-
hood strategies and social capital were collected by means of
a household survey among 200 households, comprising 848
persons, which is about 60 % of the population in the study
area. The survey included a section on the role of social
networks and trust in livelihood activities.
The study was carried out in Morelos, a rural commu-
nity that is part of the municipality Soteapan, located in the
biosphere reserve Sierra de Santa Marta (Veracruz, Mex-
ico). The villagers are indigenous Popoluca, for whom
Spanish is a second language. Soteapan is one of the most
deprived regions in the state, and among the most marginal
in the country. In 2005, 75 % of the population lived in
extreme poverty, with incomes of less than US$51.60 per
month (Buckles and Erenstein 1996; CONEVAL 2005).
Agriculture is the main livelihood activity, and local
smallholders primarily cultivate maize. The local maize
farming system is based on subsistence and commercial
production, through which farmers interact with (local)
maize markets. Maize production takes place under rain-
fed conditions and is entirely manual, due in part to the
steep, rocky terrain. Nevertheless, in terms of total pro-
duction, Morelos belongs to the top five municipalities out
of 212 municipalities in Veracruz (INEGI 2005).
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Measuring trust, adaptation strategies, and wealth
We used (semi-structured) in-depth interviews to obtain a
first impression of the characteristics and developments of
trust and social relations among community members. In
life histories, male and female respondents provided
valuable information on historical events that affected
levels of trust. Moreover, case studies provided a holistic
understanding of contemporary dynamics related to social
networks and trust. In addition, the household survey
contained three sets of trust questions. These questions are
summarized in Table 1 (part 1). The first set of questions
aims to measure personalized trust, and the second and
third set of questions seek to measure, respectively, gen-
eralized and institutionalized trust. The perceptions of
respondents on trust statements were obtained using a
5-level Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 =
strongly agree).
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Description Obs Mean SE Min Max
Part 1 Trust indicators
T1 I trust my family/friends 200 3.88 0.932 1 5
T2 I trust my compadres 200 3.355 1.060 1 5
T3 I trust my neighbors 200 3.04 1.084 1 5
T4 I trust coyotes 200 2.48 1.143 1 5
T5 I trust leaders of farmer groups 200 2.45 1.074 1 5
T6 I trust other ejidatarios/farmers 200 2.56 1.110 1 5
T7 In general, I trust most members
of the community
200 2.655 1.101 1 5
T8 In general, community members have
a cooperative attitude
200 2.685 1.180 1 5
T9 In general, community members are more
focused on own individual goals instead
of collective goals
200 2.73 1.092 1 5
T10 In general, community members support
each other
200 2.015 0.916 1 5
T11 I trust the government and their policies 200 2.72 1.187 1 5
T12 The government treats everyone equal 200 2.735 1.188 1 5
T13 People are poor because they are not given
the same changes as others
200 2.655 1.049 1 5
T14 I participate in community activities 200 1.99 1.236 1 5
T15 In general, community members participate
in community activities
200 1.703 0.566 1 5
Part 2 Land and labor allocation
Farm self-employment 200 83.866 25.689 0 100
Farm labor employment 200 5.121 14.454 0 80
Non-farm self-employment 200 4.826 13.657 0 90
Non-farm labor employment 200 5.686 17.041 0 95.2
% agricultural time on crop 200 3.85 9.819 0 80
% agricultural time on maize 200 94.8 13.865 10 100
% land allocated to maize 200 91.332 20.275 10 100
% land allocated to crop 200 8.668 20.275 0 90
Part 3 Control variables
C. VAR1 Land owned (ha.) 200 4.4 6.758 0 27
C. VAR2 Household size 200 4.24 1.791 1 12
C. VAR3 Sex household head (female = 1) 200 0.11 0.314 0 1
C. VAR4 Age household head 200 39.63 13.408 14 72
C.VAR5 Household dependency ratio 200 0.600 0.527 0 2.5
C. VAR6 Illiteracy household head (yes = 1) 200 0.47 0.500 0 1
C. VAR7 Urban land title (yes = 1) 200 0.69 0.464 0 1
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To reduce the multidimensionality of our trust variables a
factor analysis was done. Based on a principal factor model
with varimax rotation we defined three main factors under-
lying trust, representing generalized trust (factor 1), institu-
tionalized trust (factor 2), and personalized trust (factor 3).
Details of the factor analysis are provided in Table 2.
Importantly, the endogenous clustering of the data generates
variables that are broadly consistent with the theory.
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure of sample
adequacy is equal to 0.84, which indicates the variables are
appropriate and share a common value. Based on the factor
analysis we thus unbundle households’ level of trust into
PTj (level of personalized trust of household j), GTj (level
of generalized trust of household j), and ITj (level of
institutionalized trust of household j). We are interested in
the impact of each type of trust on adaptation choices, and
therefore include them separately in our model. The dif-
ferent household trust indicators can be formalized as
follows:
HTj ¼ a0PTj þ a1GTj þ a2ITj ð1Þ
where a0, a1, and a2 are parameters.
Next, we turn to the measurement of adaptation strate-
gies. The literature contains different methods of charac-
terizing livelihood adaptation strategies. Most commonly,
data on realized income underlie these classifications, i.e.,
shares of income earned in different sectors of the rural
economy (Dercon and Krishnan 1996). In contrast, we
focus on the allocation of assets across distinct activities
that reflect the (strategic) choice set of households. Such an
asset-based approach is an alternative method for analyzing
livelihood adaptation strategies, and demonstrates that the
amount of income earned (and even the type of activity
undertaken) is a function of the assets controlled by the
household (Brown et al. 2006). Following Brown et al.
(2006), we formulate asset allocation over livelihood
adaptation strategies by assuming that a utility maximizing
household allocates its assets over different activities
yielding different returns y. For each activity i this gives
the following income function:
yi ¼ fi Aið Þ þ ei ð2Þ
where an income-generating activity, Yi, is assumed to be
affected by two elements. The first is an increase in the
number and quality of productive assets available (Ai) and
a random component (ei), representing factors beyond the
control or expectation of households.
Total household income is defined as Y =
P
i yi. The
allocation options of this income function are constrained




If the household maximizes its utility of income, then its






yi ¼ RifiðAiÞ þ ei
 !
ð4Þ
The resulting choice represents the livelihood adaptation
strategy. In other words, income composition is considered
an outcome rather than a determinant of a livelihood
adaptation strategy.
We operationalized the concept of adaptation strategy
by quantifying the household’s asset portfolio. The clus-
tering of households is based on the use of two primary
assets: labor and land. Both household time allocated to
different types of productive activities (farm self-employ-
ment, farm labor employment, non-farm wage-employ-
ment, non-farm self-employment, and unskilled domestic
labor) and the household land-use pattern (land allocation
to maize production and other crops, mainly pasture) are
used to identify categories of household strategies. Table 1
(part 2) shows the summary statistics of the labor and land
variables.
We used cluster analysis to ‘group’ our observations on
the land and labor variables into distinct livelihood adap-
tation strategy types. Cluster analysis summarizes a large
number of sample observations by assigning them to a
smaller, tractable number of distinct groups—‘clusters’—
of observations. Households with similar time allocation
and land-use pattern are grouped together. First, a Ward’s
linkage hierarchical cluster analysis is used to agglomerate
clusters of observation within our data set. Based on sta-
tistical results, we identified three distinct strategy clusters
Table 2 Rotated factor analysis trust indicators
















(Blanks abs(loading) \ 0.25)
Observations = 200; v2(91) = 1299.55; Prob [ v2 = 0.00
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in the data and use this result as input for the k-means
cluster analysis to assign each household to a distinct
group. K-means cluster analysis is a method of partitioning
data into a predetermined number of groups (i.e., k = 3).
(Lattin et al. 2003). Observations are initially randomly
assigned to one of the k clusters, and then reassigned using
an iterative method to minimize within-cluster variance
and maximize between-cluster variance.
Finally, we discuss the measurement of wealth. As we
do not have complete data on household income or con-
sumption, we used the possession of consumer assets as an
indicator of wealth. Following Filmer and Pritchett (2001),
we used the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
compose a Wealth Index which allows us to compare
consumer assets endowments across households (e.g.,
television, bed, radio, bicycle, etc.). In this context the
factor ‘wealth’ is assumed to underlie ownership of all
included assets (Clarke 2006, p. 6). To ensure sampling
adequacy, the KMO test was used to compare the magni-
tudes of observed correlation coefficients with the magni-
tudes of partial correlation coefficients. The KMO measure
of sampling adequacy is equal to 0.68, indicating that the
assets share a common factor (Sahn and Stifel 2003).
Model design
Adaptation strategy choice was hypothesized to depend on
a household’s trust indicators. We estimate the overall
effect of a household’s trust as:
LCj ¼ b0 þ b1HTj þ ej; ð5Þ
where LCj refers to the livelihood adaptation choice of
household j, HTj refers to an overall trust indicator for the
household, and ej is the error term. To control for the
potential effects of the household’s capital endowments we
extended the model:
LCj ¼ b0 þ b1HTj þ b2CAPITALSj þ ej ð6Þ
where CAPITALSj is a vector of the capital endowments of
household j.
Following the livelihood framework, we assume the
livelihood strategy choice is determined by slowly chang-
ing exogenous capitals, including households’ natural,
human, social, physical, and financial capital. Natural
capital includes land owned (more land stimulates farm
activities) and land entitlements (land titles can be used as
collateral and stimulate investments). Human capital vari-
ables include household size and dependency ratio (labor
availability), sex and age of the household head (female-
headed households have specific characteristics and face
competing demand on the time of the household head), and
education level of household head (important for the off-
farm employment opportunities). Physical capital refers to
urban land entitlements (collateral). By excluding financial
and social capital, we minimize potential endogeneity
problems. For example, farmer group participation was not
used as a proxy for social capital since this is highly cor-
related with maize production strategy (these groups only
provide services to maize farmers). Table 1 (part 3) sum-
marizes these variables.
We integrate Eq. (1) into our model, which results in:
LCj ¼ b0 þ b1a0PTj þ b1a1GTj þ b1a2ITj
þ b2CAPITALSj þ ej
¼ b0 þ c0PTj þ c1GTj þ c2ITj þ b2CAPITALSj þ ej;
ð7Þ
where c0, c1, c2 are the parameters of the trust variables.
We ran a multinomial logistic regression1 to analyze the
determinants of households’ livelihood choice. A multi-
nomial logistic regression predicts the probability that a
household will select each of a set of alternative strategies
compared to a reference strategy. We use the traditionally
dominant strategy of maize farming as the reference activity,
and analyze the characteristics of households that have
adjusted to new market opportunities created by market lib-
eralization and reverted to an alternative strategy. A positive
estimated coefficient indicates an increase in the likelihood
that a household chooses the alternative livelihood strategy; a
negative coefficient indicates a lower likelihood.
Finally, we link livelihood choices to economic out-
comes for which we use an Asset Index. We use the level of
the Asset Index (Z) as our proxy for household income—a
variable less subject to shocks than annual income. The
regression is as follows:
Zj ¼ b0 þ b1STR1j þ b2STR2j þ b3CAPITALSj þ ej ð8Þ
where STR1j and STR2j are dummy variables for pursuing a
diversified livelihood strategy and pursuing a cattle-
breeding strategy, respectively.
However, the empirical approach outlined above may be
too simple. To obtain consistent estimates of the causal effect
of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable, the
error term of the model must not be correlated with the
regressors (that is E(e|x) = 0). This means that the choice for
a certain livelihood strategy should not be determined by
(omitted) factors that also influence differences in the level
of trust among households. Similarly, before we can interpret
the results of a regression model as ‘causal’ we need to rule
out ‘reverse causality’. That is: there may be two-way
interaction. Trust can impact strategies, but the economic
activities emanating from these strategies in turn may affect
trust levels as well. In such cases, the (conditional)
1 We use a multinominal logit model because adaptation strategy
choice is a polychotomous variable; i.e., it is a categorical variable
that has more than two values.
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correlation between regressor and dependent variable cannot
be interpreted as a causal effect. A common approach to
overcome these potential endogeneity problems is to use an
instrumental variable (IV) estimator (Dougherty 1992). This
instrumental variable, w, needs to be correlated with the
endogenous variables x, and uncorrelated with the error term
(so E(e|w) = 0). Hence, we are looking for exogenous
variables that determine trust levels, and do not affect
strategy choice in any way other than via trust levels.
Needless to say such instruments are scarce.
We hypothesize that personalized trust may be treated as
exogenous variable, built up slowly over one’s life in
response to extended periods of interaction with relatives and
friends. We tried to find a suitable instrumental variable to
explore this issue further, but were unsuccessful. This implies
the coefficients for personalized trust should be treated as
associations only, and not necessarily as causal effects. The
same is true for the outcomes of generalized trust.
However, we were able to find an instrumental variable for
institutionalized trust. We base our choice on the social and
historical context. Past experiences influence current levels of
institutionalized trust: people being disadvantaged by official
authorities in the past might have low levels of institutional
trust today (for example, such trust attitudes may be trans-
mitted via their parents). The recent past is characterized by
many internal conflicts concerning access to land. Some
farmers were able to keep the land that they were used to
cultivating while others did not receive land titles or received
parcels far away. We assume low levels of institutionalized
trust among this latter category of households:
ITj ¼ F DISTANCEj; TITLEj
  ð9Þ
where DISTANCEj refers to the distance of the parcel of
household j (in meters) and TITLEj refers to the parcel land
title of household j. In case the household head was
younger than 40 years old, we asked about the distance and
land title of his/her father instead because they were too
young to obtain land in 1985.2
Trust and community development in a historical
perspective
Since current levels of trust are shaped by significant
political and economic events, we first take a closer look at
relevant developments in the recent local history. Indeed,
historical variables will also play a role in the empirical
analysis that follows.
The end of the Mexican Revolution: new internal
conflicts and social friction
The Mexican Revolution officially ended in 1920, but
peace between the various revolutionary bands and guer-
rilla combatants in the Sierra de Santa Marta did not pre-
vail until 1928 (Kuhfuss 2007). New violent conflicts
emerged because of a lack of consensus on the restitution
of land among various groups of Popolucas. ‘Comunalis-
tas’ fought for the restoration of the old situation preceding
the revolution. Access to land was common at that time,
without boundaries between the different communities in
the Sierra. The young ‘agraristas’, in contrast, preferred
the government’s proposal to donate each community ejido
land, and renounced common access to land to stimulate
agricultural development and market integration (Vela´z-
quez Herna´ndez 2006). The internal conflicts resulted in
the rise of a few political leaders who used the situation to
acquire power and authority in a society with low levels of
social stratification.
Due to these conflicts, a decision concerning the resti-
tution of land was postponed and, consequently, local
smallholders kept their long-established common access to
land throughout the 1920s and 1930s. At that time nobody
owned land, but usufruct rights were carefully guarded.
People cultivated maize and beans at different small plots
scattered throughout the lowland zones of the Sierra de
Santa Marta, called milpas. Abandoned milpas became part
of the public domain (Foster 1943). People also grew other
crops and plants in different ecological zones throughout
the Sierra (Vela´zquez Herna´ndez 2001).
Foundation of Morelos: community as social capital
By the end of the 1930s, owing to the internal conflicts
about land rights, small groups of young families left their
villages to search for political and productive autonomy
and established new communities (Le´onard and Herna´ndez
2009). The community of Morelos was founded on the site
of an old ranch deserted during the revolution in 1937. The
municipality of Soteapan required the setup of an agrarian
committee (comite´ agrario) of which the president became
the key authority in the village, representing the commu-
nity in the municipality. In addition, the villagers appointed
one of the founders of the community as local judge to
mediate interpersonal disputes among villagers.
At the time of origin, about fifteen families lived in this
new community. Agriculture was the main livelihood
activity and cultivation was primarily for own consump-
tion. Households were self-supportive and enjoyed a large
measure of autonomy. There were no shops; men went to
neighboring villages to exchange their maize and beans for
other products, such as salt, soap, sugar, and lime. Intra-
2 This assumption is reliable as the quality of soil is the same
everywhere, and based on a pairwise correlation test we can conclude
that there is no significant correlation between ‘‘distance,’’ ‘‘title,’’
and ‘‘strategy 1, 2 or 3.’’
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household kin relations were the most important social
network. Inter-household interactions were mainly con-
fined to the exchange of products. Social life in the com-
munity was simple and collective action was rare. Key
informants explained that the local authority occasionally
convened a community gathering, during which commu-
nity members discussed what improvements were needed
in the village, and what collective action had to be taken.
This type of communal work, a service to the community,
was called ‘tequio’, which existed until the 1970s.
Over the years, the availability of land triggered an
inflow of new families from neighboring villages. As a
result, Morelos became one of the fastest growing com-
munities in the Sierra, causing deforestation and a decline
of the local natural resource base in the 1950s (Blanco
Rosas 2006). According to key informants, concurrent with
the growth of the population, life in the village became
more individualistic. Villagers did not trust the newcomers,
and new conflicts started to arise about access to land.
Despite the increased number of inhabitants, there were no
clubs or associations, and people had few contacts with
members of neighboring communities, except for trade
purposes.
Formation of the ejido: increased social stratification
Despite the disapproval of the local leaders who fought for
the restitution of communal land, a group of 147 farmers of
Morelos applied for ejido land in 1944 (Blanco Rosas
2006). In 1956, the government granted the donation, and
allocated the community with 3,590 ha of land. From that
moment onwards, Morelos was officially an ejido—a
community-based organization in which members, or eji-
datarios, held permanent usufruct rights to one or several
plots. Under this system, any form of land transaction was
outlawed since the Mexican government owned the ejidos
(Bouquet 2009). The newly obtained status of ejido chan-
ged the local governance structure by inducing new gov-
ernance institutions that replaced the agrarian committee:
an executive body, an oversight council, and a general
assembly.
The implementation of the ejido system affected liveli-
hood activities and local social relations. It forced farmers
to cultivate within the borders of the land allocated to the
ejido, excluding them from access to areas more adequate
for producing coffee, hunting, and fishing situated in other
parts of the Sierra de Santa Marta. Moreover, the ejido
system caused social stratification between smallholders as
only the 147 registered3 ejidatarios were allocated with
usufruct land rights. Consequently, unregistered household
heads and sons of ejidatarios who just started their own
household no longer had access to land. Those without
usufruct land rights were called avecindados. Social con-
flicts arose as the ejido law conflicted with the tradition
according to which not only each ejidatario but also each
household head—registered or not—had access to land to
become food secure. Conflicts about land intensified, and
jealous community members attacked others with
machetes, robbed each other’s harvest, and expropriated
community land. According to key informants, at that time,
the level of trust among community members was very low
and many houses permanently closed their windows with
shutters. Family life took place within the domestic domain,
and women and children hardly left the compound.
We hypothesize that the difference in rights between
ejidatarios and avecindados affects the level of institu-
tionalized trust between both groups of households (i.e.,
avecindados are likely to have lower levels of institution-
alized trust than ejidatarios). We return to this below.
Land allocation and recovery of trust
Internal conflicts delayed the distribution of land. It was
not until 1987 that all land was divided into individual
parcels, and allocated to the ejidatarios. An important issue
causing tensions among villagers was the location of the
parcels. Most preferred parcels were those at a short dis-
tance from the village. People ending up with parcels at a
large distance felt they were put at a disadvantage. (Hence,
in what follows, we use the distance of the parcel as a
variable in our empirical model as this might influence the
level of trust in local authorities and governmental insti-
tutions.) A group of avecindados organized themselves,
and in 1985 asked the general assembly of ejidatarios for
permission to split up the 590 ha of common grazing land
into individual parcels of three hectares each. This was the
first time that a grassroots organization was formed to
realize a common goal in Morelos. The ejidatarios
approved the request and granted 156 avecindados usufruct
rights to land.
While the allocation of land has attenuated internal
conflicts and increased social cohesion, the level of trust
among community members remains remarkably low.
Respondents indicate they hardly trust people beyond the
household. Representative excerpts from interviews are as
follows:
In Morelos you cannot trust many people. People are
selfish. To be honest, I only trust my own children.
Even my husband cheats me. A few weeks ago I
caught him going out with another woman in
Acayucan. Maybe it is because of my age that I have
3 According to key informants, a few household heads were not
registered because they refused to participate in the national
household census due to a lack of confidence in strangers.
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a low opinion of the trustworthiness of people. Too
often I felt a victim of corruption, lies, and fraud.
That is why I lost all my credulity. (Alejandra Al-
eman, 74);
I don’t trust any local authority or political leader.
They all are bandits. They always guarantee devel-
opments and prosperity but they never realize their
promises. The same applies to the previous Comi-
sariado Ejidal. Despite being the son of my brother he
deceived me by selling me fertilizers for twice the
market price. (Roberto Cruz, 42);
I know that if I tell my neighbors something personal
or secret, they will tell it to the entire community.
They always gossip about other people. Therefore, I
always whisper when I talk about personal matters
because I am afraid that my neighbors listen. (Claudia
Velazquez, 32);
I never lend out money to family or friends because I
am not sure they will pay me back. In our commu-
nity, people often do not follow up on agreements.
(Eduardo Mateo, 24).
As described in our theoretical review, we hypothesize
that current levels of institutionalized trust are embedded in
the past. Based on the local social–historical context of
Morelos, we expect lower levels of institutionalized trust
among household heads historically excluded from land
titles (avecindados) compared to those household heads
owing land titles (ejidatarios). Consistent with our expec-
tations, the data in Table 3 show significantly lower levels
of institutionalized trust among avecindados. These out-
comes suggest that our instrumental variable ‘land title’ is
reasonable. There are no significant differences in per-
sonalized and generalized trust between the groups. The
low level of trust in both categories is remarkable, and
confirms the results of the in-depth interviews in which key
informants depicted households as being solitary-minded,
preferring to live their life independently, working indi-
vidually, and not considering kin, neighbors, friends, and
other villagers as a source of support.
Empirical results
Our cluster analysis identified three main categories of
livelihood strategies. Table 4 summarizes the means and
standard errors for the variables that were used.
The livelihood strategy of households in cluster 1 is based
on diversified income by engaging in activities outside the
farm. Households in this cluster spend almost all their land
(92 %) and about 40 % of their productive time on agricul-
tural activities. This time is almost completely (93 %) allo-
cated to maize production. The remainder of the time is spent
mostly in temporary wage-employment (46 % of productive
time) in the farm sector (for instance at pineapple and sugar
cane plantations) and non-farm sector. Besides, they spend a
small percentage of time (about 13 %) on non-farm self-
employment. It is remarkable that households in cluster 1
have the lowest percentage of total household time spent on
domestic activities; so their dependency ratio is on average
lower than that of the households involved in cattle breeding
and maize production.
Cluster 2 includes households that use their agricultural
land and labor not only for the production of maize, but
also for pasture (about 52 % of their land and 26 % of their
agricultural labor). In addition to farm self-employment,
these households dedicate about 14.5 % of their productive
time to non-farm and off-farm activities. This cluster rep-
resents 12.5 % of the households in the sample.
Cluster 3 represents the majority of the households
(67 %). The most distinguishing feature of households in
cluster 3 is that they primarily allocate their household
productive time (about 97 %) and land (99 %) to the pro-
duction of maize. They do not use on-farm and off-farm
alternative income sources to supplement their maize
income. Households in this cluster have the highest
dependency ratio suggesting that the household is charac-
terized by a higher percentage of women and/or children
who do not contribute to the household income compared
to households involved in cattle breeding and diversified
livelihood activities.
Correlations between trust and livelihood strategy
choice
We run a multinomial logistic regression to analyze how
personalized, generalized, and institutionalized trust influ-
enced household’s livelihood choice. The outcomes of this
regression are presented in Table 5 (maize cultivation is
treated as the omitted category).






















* p \ 0.1; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
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The model outcomes help us to obtain a better under-
standing of the factors that determine livelihood adaptation
choices. Households having more generalized and institu-
tionalized trust are more likely to be involved in the
diversified livelihood strategy than in the maize producing
strategy. By contrast, high levels of personalized trust are
negatively correlated with livelihood diversification but
positively associated with the cattle-breeding strategy. This
means that people with high levels of personalized trust are
more likely to be involved in cattle breeding and pasture
growing than in the maize production strategy.
Not surprisingly, the table also demonstrates that other
household characteristics are correlated with livelihoods.
For example, households owning many hectares are more
likely to be engaged in the cattle-breeding strategy than in
maize production. Similarly, households entitled with
urban land are more likely to invest in cattle breeding than
continuing maize production. Households with female
household heads appear to be involved in an alternative
strategy and are less likely to pursue maize production.
Furthermore, household size matters for the livelihood
choice: a large household is positively correlated with
participating in diversified livelihood strategies. Moreover,
high dependency ratios are positively correlated with being
involved in maize production.4
As mentioned, the analysis potentially suffers from an
endogeneity problem. For example, one could argue that
people participating in diversified livelihood activities are
more involved in markets, and learn more about the
intentions and behavior of others and as such enhance trust
(Tu and Bulte 2010) or perhaps there are omitted variables
driving both trust and livelihood choice. We therefore run
an IV probit model, where we instrument for institution-
alized trust (using land entitlement and location of the
parcel as excluded instruments in the first stage). The
outcomes of this model were only significant in case of
strategy choice 1, the diversification strategy, which is the
only result shown in Table 6.
The results of the 1st stage (column 3) suggest our
instruments are able to predict institutionalized trust (i.e.,
are able to identify exogenous variation in this potentially
endogenous variable). Moreover, the (predicted) institu-
tionalized trust still enters significantly and with the correct
sign in the 2nd stage of the analysis (column 2) supports
the view that there is a positive causal relationship between
institutionalized trust and diversified livelihood strategy.
Hence, households having more institutional trust are, as a
result of that, more likely to be involved in the diversified
livelihood strategy.
Trust as a key determinant of livelihoods
We use qualitative data to interpret and complement the
outcomes of the survey. Our qualitative data confirm the
associations resulting from the multivariate analysis, and
support the view that the relations between personalized
and generalized trust are not only associations but causal
relations (even if we do not have appropriate instrumental
variables to formally ‘test’ these hypotheses). Moreover,
the data validate the direction of rationale: trust determines
livelihood choices.
Table 4 Livelihood strategy categories estimated via K-median cluster analysis
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Land allocation ( % of cultivated land)
Maize 92.2 3.03 48.1 3.97 99.1 0.40
Pasture 7.8 3.04 51.9 3.91 0.92 0.40
Labor allocation ( % of productive time)
Farm self-employment 39.6 2.79 83.4 3.93 97.1 0.65
Farm wage employment 20.9 4.01 3.6 1.69 0.71 0.34
Non-farm self-employment 13.3 3.66 12.9 3.45 1.50 0.50
Non-farm wage employment 26.2 4.72 0.1 0.00 0.65 0.32
Domestic time and education ( % of total household time) 40.7 3.25 44.9 4.34 47.3 1.35
Agricultural time allocation
Agricultural time on maize 93.4 2.97 74.0 3.56 99.1 0.44
Agricultural time on other crops/pasture 6.6 1.20 26.0 2.76 0.92 0.24
n ( %) 40 (20 %) 25 (12.5 %) 135 (67.5 %)
Name of livelihood strategy Diversified smallholder Cattle and pasture farmer Maize farmer
4 We have computed the marginal effects for each variable.
Institutionalized trust seems to be a relatively important variable that
has a significant positive effect on livelihood diversification and a
negative effect on maize production (data available on request).
50 S. F. Groenewald, E. Bulte
123
The diversified livelihood strategy includes households
that allocate a considerable percentage of their labor to
non-farm and off-farm income generating activities. Both
push and pull factors stimulate livelihood diversification.
Low maize prices and high input costs force smallholders
to get involved in additional (non-farm) income generating
activities. Moreover, changing market conditions and
increasing demand for agricultural labor in other areas of
the country have stimulated (temporarily) migration among
farmers from Morelos.
Frequently, household members hear about job oppor-
tunities from villagers, intermediaries, or suppliers in
Acayucan. Therefore, one needs to have an extensive net-
work to get involved in off-farm livelihood activities. For
this reason, generalized trust is positively associated with
livelihood diversification strategy. The chance to gain
additional income makes young men leave their family for a
few weeks, months, or sometimes years to work in the
construction industry or at plantations. People without
strong social ties with kin and community members are
more likely to stay away from their household for extended
periods of time. Consequently, low levels of personalized
trust are associated with people pursuing labor work outside
the community. People who leave the village for a long time
are not able to continue their maize production or other
agricultural activities. This requires a high level of institu-
tionalized trust as they have to give up their source of food
security and become completely dependent on the market.
Another common type of non-farm work is starting up
your own business. This livelihood activity requires a high
level of generalized and institutionalized trust. A good
relationship with middlemen and wholesalers may lead to
price reductions or deferred payments, which are crucial to
remain in business in the first months. Moreover, running a
small shop or cantina (small bar) involves generalized and
institutionalized trust as you have to negotiate with
strangers and become an active player in the market.
Farmers engaged in the cattle-breeding strategy own a
few heads of cattle and/or use (part of) their land for pasture
instead of maize. Farmers do not have to visit their cattle
every day as the cows are not used for dairy production.
They lead the cattle out to pasture and occasionally check
the physical condition of their livestock. Cattle breeding is
often combined with pasture growing which is a labor-
extensive activity, since pasture needs less fertilizers and
pesticides than maize. Consequently, smallholders involved
in this strategy are less dependent on hired labor, and
interact less with other people. For this reason, trust in
strangers (or generalized trust) is not crucial for them.
In contrast, households involved in cattle breeding often
work close together with kin. Investments in cattle are
high, and frequently family members share the costs. This
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Standard errors in parentheses
Pseudo R2 = 0.3676; LR v2 (20) = 124.55
Strategy 3 = base outcome
Table 6 Instrumental variable probit
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involves agreeing on when to slaughter, sell, or buy live-
stock. Households often start working together when two
or three sons inherit a fraction of their fathers parcel each.
They may collectively sell a part of the land and invest the
revenues in purchasing heads of cattle. Many times,
brothers live at the same compound, stimulating coopera-
tion. Collective investment in cattle requires a high level of
trust among kin, which explains the positive association
between cattle breeding and personalized trust in the
Table 5.
Traditionally, smallholders produce maize to support
themselves. From generation to generation, smallholders
transmit the knowledge on how to grow maize. Conse-
quently, households can autonomously cultivate their own
produce without any interference of others. For this reason,
while high levels of trust in kin is important, trust in people
beyond the household or in the institutional environment is
not required. This is in line with the independent and sol-
itary norms present in the community.
However, since the introduction of monoculture maize
production and the introduction of improved seed varieties at
the beginning of the 1990s, smallholders have become more
dependent on agrochemicals such as pesticides and fertiliz-
ers, the application of which is labor-intensive. To produce
greater market surpluses, smallholders use these agro-
chemicals and hire labor workers for support. While histor-
ically reciprocity among kin relations beyond the household
and close friends was common, nowadays everybody wants
to receive a day wage for their labor. As a result, an
increasing number of smallholders hire people beyond the
family, and generalized trust becomes more important.
Since the liberalization of the agricultural sector and the
withdrawal of government supports to smallholders, the
input market has become complex with a wide spectrum of
suppliers. The position of the smallholders tends to be weak
because of their lack of education and knowledge. As a
result one would expect that smallholders will become more
dependent on knowledge and information sharing with
others, and that in the future personalized and generalized
trust will play a more important role in maize production.
On the other hand, without an increase in levels of institu-
tionalized trust, smallholders will not easily leave maize
production and switch to other better marketable products.
Trust and wealth
Finally, we use an asset index as a proxy for household
wealth, and explore whether this index is positively corre-
lated with involvement in the diversified or cattle-breeding
strategy. Table 7 shows the results of a simple regression
model. We conclude that, conditional on household charac-
teristics, livelihood strategies are not significantly correlated
with wealth. That is: different forms of trust appear to affect
livelihood choices, but in turn these choices are not very
consequential for our measure of household wealth (after
taking other factors into account that explain wealth). This is
consistent with a simple economics choice model where
sizable income differences across livelihood strategies are
gradually arbitraged away.
Discussion and conclusion
A growing literature identifies the importance of adaptation
strategies for dealing with variability and change in the
socio-economic systems in which smallholders live. We
argue that social capital—and trust in particular—offers
ways into understanding the role of the social and institu-
tional context in such adaptive behavior. We base our
conclusions on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the
relationship between trust, livelihood strategy choice, and
wealth. In particular, we have investigated the role of
personalized, generalized, and institutional trust in adap-
tation choices of smallholders after recent neoliberal mar-
ket reforms.
Our most significant result is that households with a high
level of generalized and institutionalized trust are more
Table 7 Correlation between wealth and adaptation strategy choice
Wealth Coefficient
Diversified smallholder strategy 0.462
(0.354)
Cattle and pasture farmer strategy 0.728
(0.459)
Sex household head (female = 1) -0.256
(0.461)
Age household head -0.017
(0.012)
Household dependency ratio -0.387
(0.295)
Illiterate household head (yes = 1) -0.294
(0.263)








* p \ 0.1; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
F (9,190) = 5.68; Prob [ F = 0.00
R2 = 0.2120; Pseudo R2 = 0.1747
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likely to invest productive assets (time and land) in alter-
native livelihood strategies. By contrast, households with
high personalized trust are more likely to be engaged in
cattle breeding and pasture growing activities.
While such correlations are of interest in themselves,
they are even more interesting when we can interpret them
as ‘causal’. Our data allow us to verify this for one specific
form of trust—institutional trust. Our qualitative analysis
of the local historical context suggests one plausible
instrumental variable that we have used for this purpose.
Our historical analysis suggests that livelihood adapta-
tion is the result of long-standing processes that are
intrinsically intertwined with processes of community
development and trust building in which contingencies and
path-dependency play a significant role. We describe how
changing market conditions and macro-economic policy
reforms have affected the external vulnerability context of
smallholders in Morelos. In the course of three generations,
land tenure and the farming system changed from an
indigenous slash-and-burn, patchy, common land-use sys-
tem, into a regulated and registered ejido characterized by
individual usufruct land rights, and finally into a commu-
nity of smallholders with individual land titles. In this
process, not all smallholders were treated equally, and not
all households have benefitted from new land titles or land
reallocations. We used this information to motivate an IV
model by assuming that smallholders who received land
titles have a higher level of generalized and institutional
trust than smallholders who have no access to land.
Moreover, the location of the appointed land is used as an
instrument since parcels located nearby the community
were favored. The outcomes of our IV model make our
assumption valid that generalized trust partly determines
the adaptation choice of households. However, it is
important to emphasize that the coefficient is small, and the
role of generalized trust appears relatively modest.
Another result is a positive association between per-
sonalized trust and participation in cattle breeding.
Unfortunately, we did not find an appropriate instrumental
variable to verify a causal effect. However, in-depth
interviews with local farmers made clear that before
starting cattle-breeding activities households often have a
high level of personalized trust. Frequently, smallholders
and kin relations invest together in cattle, as this livelihood
strategy requires many hectares of land and a large starting
capital. This supports the view that personalized trust
shapes the livelihood choice.
Overall, lack of generalized and institutionalized trust
seems to explain why most smallholders continue producing
maize. People who do not trust ‘markets’ show risk-averse
behavior, and prefer to provide for their own food rather than
search for other livelihood opportunities. Hence, trust and
formal institutions are complements in the sense that greater
trust in strangers and institutions results in greater market
participation. This is consistent with evidence presented by
Tu and Bulte (2010). However, our study also suggests that
this choice is not very consequential in terms of asset accu-
mulation. Controlling for a range of household characteris-
tics we find no evidence of a significant correlation between
livelihood strategies and wealth (which does not imply that
livelihood strategies are inconsequential for revenues,
income or income stability, of course).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
References
Ahlerup, P., O. Olsson, and D. Yanagizawa. 2009. Social capital vs
institutions in the growth process. European Journal of Political
Economy 25(1): 1–14.
Algan, Y., and P. Cahuc. 2006. Why is the minimum wage so high in
low-trust countries? Mimeo University of Paris 1.
Algan, Y., and P. Cahuc. 2007. Social attitudes and macroeconomic
performance: An epidemiological approach. Mimeo University
of Paris 1.
Arrow, K.J. 1972. Gifts and exchanges. Philosophy & Public Affairs
1: 343–362.
Beugelsdijk, S., H.L.F. De Groot, and A.B.T.M. Schaik. 2004. Trust
and economic growth: A robustness analysis. Oxford Economic
Papers 56: 118–134.
Blanco Rosas, J.L. 2006. Erosion de la Agrodiversidad en la Milpa de
los Zoque Popoluca de Soteapan: Xutuchincon y Aktevet.
Mexico D.F.: Universidad Iberoamericana.
Bouquet, E. 2009. State-led land reform and local institutional
change: Land titles, land markets and tenure security in Mexican
communities. World Development 37(8): 1390–1399.
Brown, Douglas.R., Emma.C. Stephens, James.Okuro. Oumac, Fes-
tus.M. Murithid, and Christopher.B. Barrett. 2006. Livelihood
strategies in the rural Kenyan highlands. African Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics 1(1): 21–36.
Buckles, D., and O. Erenstein. 1996. Intensifying maize-based
cropping systems in the Sierra de Santa Marta, Veracruz.
NRG Paper 96-07. Mexico, DF: CIMMYT.
Bussolo, M., and H.S. Lecomte. 1999. Trade liberalisation and
poverty. Poverty Briefing Paper No. 6. London: The Overseas
Development Institute.
Caldero´n, C., C. Alberto, and G. Arturo. 2002. Development efficiency
of the financial sector and links with trust: Cross-country evidence.
Economic Development and Cultural Change 51(1): 189–204.
Clarke, R. 2006. Measuring wealth across seven Thai communities.
WeD Working Paper No. 17. Bath: ESRC Research Group on
Wellbeing in Development Countries, University of Bath.
CONEVAL. 2005. Poblacio´n Total, Pobreza por Ingresos, Indica-
dores, Indice y Grado de Rezago Social, Segu´n Municipio.
Dasgupta, P. 1998. Trust as a commodity. In Trust: Making and
breaking cooperative relations, ed. D. Gambetta, 49–72. Oxford:
Basil Blackford.
Davies, S. 1993. Are coping strategies a cop out? IDS Bulletin 24(4):
60–72.
Davies, S., and N. Hossain. 2007. Livelihood adaptation, public
action and civil society: A review of the literature. IDS Working
Paper No. 57.
Trust and livelihood adaptation 53
123
Dercon, S., and P. Krishnan. 1996. A consumption-based measure of
poverty in Ethiopia 1989–1994. In Poverty and economic reform
in Ethiopia, proceedings annual conference of the Ethiopian
Economic Association.
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, and U. Sunde. 2006. The
intergenerational transmission of risk and trust attitudes. IZA
Discussion Paper No. 2380. Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur
Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor.
Dougherty, C. 1992. Introduction to econometrics. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Durlauf, S.N., and M. Fafchamps. 2004. Social capital. NBER
Working Paper No. W10485. Madison: Department of Econom-
ics, National Bureau of Economic Research, University of
Wisconsin.
Easterly, W. 2005. The white man’s burden. New York: The Penguin
Press.
Ellis, F. 2000. Rural livelihood and diversity in developing countries:
Analysis, methods, policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Emirbayer, M., and A. Mische. 1994. What is agency? American
Journal of Sociology 103(4): 962–1023.
Fafchamps, M. 2002. Social capital, trust, and development. Social
development strategy. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Filmer, D., and L.H. Pritchett. 2001. Estimating wealth effects
without expenditure data-or tears: An application to educational
enrollments in States of India. Demography 38(1): 115–132.
Foster, G.M. 1943. The geographical, linguistic, and cultural position
of the Popoluca of Veracruz. American Anthropologist 45(4):
531–546.
Fukuyama, F. 1995. Trust: The social virtues and the creation of
prosperity. London: Hamish Hamilton.
Gambetta, D. 1998. Trust: Making and breaking cooperative
relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Garfinkel, H. 1963. A conception of, and experiments with ‘‘Trust’’ as
a condition of stable concerted actions. In Motivation and social
interaction: Cognitive determinants, ed. O.J. Harvey, 187–238.
New York: The Ronald Press.
Grootaert, C., and T. Van Bastelaer. 2002. Understanding and
measuring social capital: A multidisciplinary tool for practitio-
ners. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales. 2006. Does culture affect
economic outcomes? Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 23–48.
Hughes, P., J. Bellamy, and A. Black. 2000. Breaking social trust
trough education. In Social capital and public policy in
Australia, ed. L. Winter, 225–249. Melbourne: Australian
Institute of Family Studies.
INEGI. 2005. Direccio´n General de Estadı´stica, Direcccio´n General
Adjunta de Estadı´sticas Sociodemogra´ficas; Direccı´on de Ana´li-
sis y Estudios Demogra´ficos.
Knack, S. 2000. Trust, associational life and economic performance.
In Paper presented at HRDC-OECD international symposium on
the contribution of investment in human and social capital to
sustained economic growth and wellbeing. Washington, DC: The
World Bank.
Knack, S., and P. Keefer. 1997. Does social capital have an economic
pay-off? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112(4): 1251–1288.
Kramer, R.M. 1999. Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging
perspectives, enduring questions. Annual Review in Psychology
50: 569–598.
Kuhfuss, L. 2007. Enchaˆssement Social des Arrangements Contrac-
tuels dans la Ce´re´aliculture Marchande en Zone Indienne: Etude
de Cas a` Morelos, Etat de Veracruz, Mexique. Master Thesis.
Montpellier: Universite´ Montpellier.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Schleifer, and R.W. Vishny.
1997. Trust in large organisations. American Economic Review
87: 333–338.
Lattin, J., J.D. Carroll, and P.E. Green. 2003. Analyzing multivariate
data. Toronto: Thomson Brooks/Cole.
Le´onard, E., and E. Vela´zquez Herna´ndez. 2009. El Reparto Agrario
y el Fraccionamiento de los Territorios Comunitarios en el
Sotavento Veracruzano: Construccio´n Local del Estado e
Impugnacio´n del Proyecto Comunal. In El Istmo Mexicano:
Una Regio´n Inasequible. Estado, Poderes Locales y Dina´micas
Espaciales (Siglos XVI–XXI), eds. E. Vela´zquez Herna´ndez, E.
Le´onard, O. Hoffmann, and M.-F. Pre´voˆt-Schapira, 399–454.
Me´xico, DF: Publicaciones de la Casa Chata.
Murray, C. 2001. Livelihood research: some conceptual and meth-
odological issues. CPRC Background Paper 5.
Pelling, M., and C. High. 2005. Understanding adaptation: What can
social capital offer assessments of adaptive capacity? Global
Environmental Change Part A 15(4): 308–319. doi:10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2005.02.001.
Pennartz, P., and A. Niehof. 1999. The domestic domain: Changes,
choices and strategies of family households. Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing Limited.
Platteau, J.P. 1994. Behind the market stage where real societies exist:
Part I—the role of public and private order institutions. Journal
of Development Studies 30(3): 533–577.
Portes, A. 1998. Social capital: Its origin and applications in modern
sociology. Annual Review of Sociology 24: 1–24.
Putnam, R.D. 1995. Bowling alone: America’s declining social
capital. Journal of Democracy 6(1): 65–78.
Putnam, R.D. 1998. Foreword. Housing Policy Debate 9(1): V–viii.
Sabatini, F. 2009. Does social capital create trust? Evidence from a
community of entrepreneurs. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Working Paper No. 305. Siena: University of Siena.
Sahn, D., and D. Stifel. 2003. Exploring alternative measures of
welfare in the absent of expenditure data. Review of Income and
Wealth 49(4): 463–489.
Smit, B., and J. Wandel. 2006. Adaptation, adaptive capacity and
vulnerability. Global Environmental Change 16(3): 282–292.
Stone, W. 2001. Measuring social capital: towards a theoretically
informed measurement framework for researching social capital
in family and community life. Research Paper No. 24. Mel-
bourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies.
Tabillini, G. 2007. Institutions and culture. CEPR Discussion Paper
No. 330. Milano: Universita Bocconi.
Tu, Q., and E. Bulte. 2010. Trust, market participation and economic
outcomes: Evidence from Rural China. World Development
38(8): 1179–1190.
Uphoff, N. 2000. Understanding social capital: Learning from the
analysis and experience of participation. In Social capital: A
multifaceted perspective, ed. P. Dasgupta, and I. Serageldin.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Uslaner, E.M. 1999. Trust and consequences. Paper Presented to the
Communitarian Summit, February 1999, Arlington, VA.
Uslaner, E.M. 2002. The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Vela´zquez Herna´ndez, E. 2001. El Territorio de los Popolucas de
Soteapan, Veracruz: Transformaciones en la Organizacio´n y
Apropiacio´n del Espacio. Relaciones 87(22): 17–47.
Vela´zquez Herna´ndez, E. 2006. Territorios Fragmentados: Estado y
Comunidad Indı´gena en el Istmo Veracruzano. Me´xico, DF:
Publicaciones de la Casa Chata.
Whiteley, P.F. 2000. Economic growth and social capital. Political
Studies 48(2000): 443–466.
Wise, T.A. 2007. Policy space for mexican maize: Protecting agro-
biodiversity by promoting rural livelihoods. Working Paper No.
07-01. Medford MA: Tufts University.
Zak, P.J., and S. Knack. 2001. Trust and growth. Economic Journal
111: 295–321.
54 S. F. Groenewald, E. Bulte
123
Zoomers, E.B. 1999. Livelihood strategies and development: Expe-
riences from the Bolivian Andes. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical
Institute.
Author Biographies
Sytske F. Groenewald PhD, wrote her doctoral thesis for the
Wageningen University in The Netherlands. Her study focuses on
livelihood strategies of small-scale maize producers in Veracruz
(Mexico) under NAFTA and emphasizes the significant role of social
capital in their adaptation process. She holds a degree in Cultural
Anthropology (MA) and International Economics (BA) from Utrecht
University, The Netherlands.
Erwin Bulte PhD, is professor of economics at Wageningen
University and Tilburg University. He is also a research fellow at
the University of Cambridge, UK, and an advisor to the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization. His research interests lie at the interface of
natural resources, economic growth and development, and institu-
tional change.
Trust and livelihood adaptation 55
123
